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   Robert Pfaller:  
 Theorist of public grace 
    Gijs van Oenen 
 
An aesthetics of delegated enjoyment? Sure. An escape from prevailing 
ideologies? Indeed. An exposure of capitalist commodified happiness? 
Check. A key to understanding the paradoxes of our cynical-hedonist 
era? Absolutely. Robert Pfaller’s disquisition on interpassivity is all that its 
back flap promises, and more. But reading this new book, and rereading 
earlier publications, make me believe that there is something else 
brewing in Pfaller’s heterodox writings – something that is perhaps less in 
line with the image we have of a cultural theorist taking his bearings from 
Althusser, Lacan, Spinoza, Mannoni and Zizek. Something more – forgive 
me philosophers – of a sociological nature. I believe we can also read 
Pfaller as a theorist of public space. Or, given his predilection for graceful 
acts of enjoyable togetherness, we can read him more specifically as a 
theorist of public grace.  
 
 To be sure, displays of public grace in the Pfallerian sense are not 
merely pleasurable and elegant sights and experiences—they are also 
acts of resistance, of refusal, of defiance even. This is in line with their 
origin in the versatile and prolific concept of interpassivity, which in its 
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own idiosyncratic way signals both resignation and opposition. 
Interpassivity, both as a phenomenon and as an object of study, was 
born in the mid-1990s, prodded to life as a reaction to “the overwhelming 
dominance at the time of the discourse of interactivity.”1 The discourse of 
interactivity charges us with responsibilities not to be taken lightly: we are 
not just to consume – art, policy, or whatever – but also to become 
engaged and involved with, and accept co-responsibility for, the product 
we are consuming and the relation in which we find ourselves with it. 
These responsibilities are all the more difficult to evade, or refuse, or 
criticize, as they are the product of the 1990s confluence of two 
previously quite separate, or even hostile, political affinities. On the one 
hand, neoliberal ideology, which incites people to assume individual 
responsibility for their situation despite the overwhelming force of 
economic and social powers; on the other hand, leftist ideology stuck in 
the post-68 emancipatory discourse of participation and democratic co-
creation.2 Interpassivity is a move to counter, evade, or sabotage this 
nefarious new political and artistic consensus. 
 
 That sounds like a plan! Let us not be co-opted into this kind of 
“democracy and other neoliberal fantasies,” to speak with Jodi Dean.3 
Pfaller’s remedy is as striking as is his diagnosis. His preferred counter-
measures do not entail strikes, occupations, or political agitation – to the 
contrary, they have to do with our experience of enjoyment (Lust). Or 
more specifically, with how and why we may wish to delegate 
enjoyment, even surreptitiously enjoying such delegation of enjoyment. 
This strategy of course raises some questions (as well as eyebrows). 
Such as: how is one supposed to delegate enjoyment, especially while 
incurring enjoyment through such delegation? And moreover: how could 
enjoyment, of whatever kind, be an effective countermeasure against 
powerful political and social forces like neoliberalism and emancipation? 
Why would it have the capacity to make us act and behave in public 
without succumbing to these forces? What is graceful about it? And is it 
even a countermeasure – rather than one more ploy of dominant 
ideology? 
 




 I aim to approach these and related matters in the following way. 
The first step is to see that enjoyment has become an object of legitimate 
interest, for theorists like Pfaller, because there is something problematic 
about it. And perhaps more importantly: something has made it become 
problematic – a consideration which introduces an historical dimension 
into the discussion. This dimension seems indispensable to me to make 
interpassivity theory work in a more sociological and political sense, 
although I realize this brushes against the structuralist grain of 
interpassivity as conceived originally by Robert Pfaller, and Slavoj Zizek. 
Next, I connect the idea of a “disturbed relation to enjoyment” to two 
important historical developments in western culture in the last half 
century. In this way, we will indeed be able to acquire a key to 
“understanding the paradoxes of our cynical-hedonist era.” In the 1960s 
and 1970s, we witness the impact of emancipatory discourse and 
practice, connected to ideals of democratic involvement with collective 
decisionmaking, but importantly also to ideals of self-understanding and 
self-realisation. Through what we might call a narcissistic backlash, this 
has led to a structural change – a deterioration – of the public sphere. 
Enjoyment becomes connected to self-exposure in the public sphere. 
Here is where I see an important connection between Pfaller’s work and 
that of social theorist Richard Sennett and, although perhaps less 
crucially, Michel Foucault. The 1990s then provide a neoliberal turn, 
through which enjoyment explicitly becomes enlisted in the service of 
neoliberal ideology, as brought out in contemporary expressions like 
“flexible man” and “work hard, play hard.” To enjoy is to become a 
Genußarbeiter, as Svenja Flaßpöhler has aptly put it.4 This interactive 
commitment to maximize both emancipation and enjoyment, leads to 
interpassivity as a “refusal to refuse” – a way to avoid becoming caught in 
the trap of a “surplus of positivity,” to speak with Byung-Chul Han.5 Public 
interpassive ritual may be among the most important answers we 




What the heck is interpassivity? And in what possible ways could 
enjoyment count as a defence against the onslaughts of neoliberalism? 




These are questions which readily present themselves to the minds of 
those newly introduced to Pfaller’s work. And indeed they often pop up in 
the many interviews Pfaller has given to popular media which have 
worked up an interest in interpassivity as it appears to resonate with the 
causes of ‘lifestyle’ they champion.6 This in itself is a good point to start, 
as it is both surprising and heartening that through Pfaller’s ministrations 
such an abstruse theory like that of interpassivity – the term itself is 
enough to scare off most of the potential broader public – has been able 
to appeal to such a broad interest. And this not in the guise of what 
university bureaucracy condescendingly calls “popularization,” a kind of 
hawking of serious academic work to mass media “outlets,” but as a 
happy example of philosophy not only studying popular culture, but 
actually managing to attract its interest and, literally and figuratively, 
speak to it. 
 
 Of course, much also goes wrong or gets lost at this interface of 
academic and popular culture! For instance, when our protagonist is 
vulgarly requested by his interviewers to disclose some of his own 
indiscretions, irrationalities, or stupidities – to which he rightly gives either 
a suitably banal answer, or a meta-reply like: “the most irrational act now 
would be to disclose my most irrational act.”7 Of course, the banality is to 
be expected, and endured. More dangerous, and more pertinent to our 
topic, is the “human interest” purport in these lifestyle-related interview 
questions. These betray an ineradicable desire to discern a human being 
behind the “mask” of the academic philosopher. “Which are your 
personal pleasures, Herr Pfaller? Give us a peek – be candid now!” Here 
our protagonist is faced with what Richard Sennett called “the tyranny of 
intimacy,” to be discussed further down in more detail, which equates the 
real-world value of academic thought with the degree to which it can be 
personalized.8 One of the virtues of Pfaller’s writing is that his form of 
“popularization” of interpassivity has managed to avoid the pitfalls and 
temptations of intimacy and narcissism. 
 
 We now first need to address how enjoyment might constitute a 
defense against neoliberal powers. Is enjoyment not something rather 
implied and promoted by neoliberalism, and more generally by 




capitalism, for instance through commercials? And has not Hollywood’s 
Kulturindustrie already been denounced by Horkheimer and Adorno, in 
their Dialektik der Aufklärung? Pfaller however argues the opposite: 
capitalism and the Kulturindustrie, or its present-day equivalent, frustrate, 
constrain, and inhibit our enjoyment, rather than elicit it. This is basically 
because, for Pfaller, enjoyment stands for, or equals, “passivity.” Although 
this notion caused some discussion in the community of interpassivity 
authors9 (is visiting a traditional museum, or reading a book, something 
passive?) we can understand it in the present context as: the condition or 
ability to not be pressured by the demand – the ideology – that we be 
active and self-determining, the expectation (of both ourselves and 
others) that we participate in both individual and collective self-
realisation.  
 
 The paradox, or trap, here is that we are invited to engage in ever 
more strenuous and ambitious (inter)activity in order to be self-
determining and achieve self-determination, while actually it is precisely 
the “passive” aspect that is most determinative and specific about us. 
This passive part is the part that we cannot control, discipline, or 
otherwise manipulate.10 As this is unwelcome news in our modern 
society, we try to minimize – or in interpassivity: outsource – this 
unmaneagable part of ourselves by frantically engaging in active 
shaping of self and society. This is where neoliberal and leftist projects 
meet, according to Pfaller. In their confluence, they constitute an ideology 
of “boundless moderation,” or in other words, of a “stunning ascetism”.11 
This imposes a demand of maximum responsibility upon us, while 
denying us the enjoyment of passivity (or the passivity of enjoyment).  
 
 In this way, we can indeed see how one could claim that 
enjoyment may be conceived to counter neoliberal ideology (as well as 
the leftist cause of emancipation). The argument however raises at least 
as many questions as it answers, and most of what follows will be an 
attempt to deal with those questions. A first point to notice is that this 
argument implies that enjoyment is something problematic. All is not as it 
should be; something is precluding us from enjoying enjoyment, so to 
speak. The source of this problematic nature seems to be neoliberalism, 




or more broadly capitalism. This would imply that removing capitalism 
would remove the hindrances to enjoying enjoyment. Which would be a 
relatively straightforward diagnosis, familiar from, say, Wilhelm Reich’s 
The sexual revolution. 
 
However, there is more at stake here. Pfaller takes on not only 
neoliberalism and capitalism, but also the whole Western or (North-west) 
European culture of Enlightenment and of protestantism. For the 
Enlightenment part, notice his indignation at Kant’s dictum that 
oppression is due to man’s own laziness, as he is too lazy to use his 
abilities to be his own master.12 Indeed, Hegel rightly turned this insight 
upside down in his master-slave dialectics: it is the master who is too 
lazy to do his own work, and thus gets to depend on the slave who does 
it for him. And then famously Marx turned Hegel upside down by pointing 
out that the roles of master and slave were assigned through (capitalist) 
relations of production. The point is that it is not merely capitalism which 
is to blame here for Pfaller, but in fact the philosophical culture of (early) 
modern Europe. 
 
 Which, of course, importantly also includes protestantism. See 
here for instance Pfaller’s complaint that “in the 1980s, Documenta 
looked like a catholic church; now, more like a protestant one: lots of text, 
few pleasurable objects.”13 This is one reason why Slavoj Zizek, on the 
back flap, calls Interpassivity “a great founding text of social thought, on a 
par with works of classics like Max Weber.” The point here is of course 
the protestant ethic. Already at its inception, capitalism was intimately 
tied up not only with the practice of bookkeeping, imported from Italy, but 
also with the “boundless moderation” and “stunning ascetism” of 
protestantism. If there is one mortal enemy of protestantism, it is certainly 
enjoyment. Equally obviously, this makes Pfaller’s theory vulnerable to the 
charge of being partial to catholicism, a suspicion corroborated by the 
telling fact that he is a native of Vienna. 
 
 We may have legitimate issues with all three of these possible 
culprits – capitalism, Enlightenment, Protestantism – but for the diagnosis 
as well as for the possible therapy it is not indifferent which target we 




choose. Suppose we succeed in abolishing capitalism, which for 
instance would certainly please Zizek (I am not really sure about Pfaller) 
– would we then also need to abolish, or somehow overcome, 
Enlightenment? And protestantism? And perhaps modernity in general? 
Again, legitimate issues, but one would like to know which enemies to 
fight, so as not to end up in disappointment, or confusion. 
 
And there is one more problem here. Whether it is capitalism, 
Enlightenment or protestant culture we choose to blame for messing 
with our enjoyment, this kind of argument is at odds with the Lacanian 
strain in Pfaller’s (and also Zizek’s) interpassivity notion. According to the 
Lacanian view, enjoyment is never unproblematic and always and 
everywhere somehow screwed up. There is always something non-
enjoyable about enjoyment, as there is no such thing as ‘simple’, ‘mere’, 
or ‘pure’ (unmediated) enjoyment, at least not in western societies. This is 
because our self-understanding is not only always routed through (the 
perception of) the other, which is standard Hegelian fare, but this 
rerouting for Lacan always inevitably introduces a distortion. As Zizek has 
put it, ‘there is no freedom outside the traumatic encounter with the 
opacity of the Other’s desire’.14 Both self-understanding and enjoyment 
are therefore always pathological. Maybe there is a special kind of 
pathology that is characteristic of capitalism, or protestantism (or of 
course catholicism). But the structural(ist) nature of the Lacanian insight 
into these matters does not sit well with any reference to historically 
specific developments, such as that of capitalism, or protestantism, in 
(early) modern European history. Like in my earlier critical assessments 
of Pfaller’s and Zizek’s work, I propose to de-emphasize the Lacanian 
dimension, in order to make a more historically and sociologically 
informed analysis possible.15 And in fact, Interpassivity contains just two 
passing references to Lacan – both concerning the interpassive function 
of the chorus in Greek tragedy – so hopefully I as well can be forgiven for 











Deemphasizing a structuralist dimension and foregrounding a historical 
dimension implies claiming that interpassivity is a phenomenon 
produced and experienced under certain social, economic, and cultural 
conditions. It is a product of certain developments within western culture. 
More specifically, in my view, interpassivity is a condition born in the 
1990s, in reaction to a number of historical constellations or forces which 
start with Enlightenment and culminate in the confluence of interactive 
government and neoliberal ideology.16 Hence it is not a coincidence that 
Robert Pfaller, together with Slavoj Zizek, “discovered” interpassivity 
around 1995; they encountered it around that time, and not in say 1971, 
1908 or 1830, simply because it didn’t yet exist. What did exist earlier than 
the 1990s are three historical constellations or developments through 
which what we call interpassivity eventually took shape. These are: the 
rise of Enlightenment and modernity, the radical emancipatory dynamics 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the rise of the interactive paradigm 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
 It is thus correct to say that certain aspects or dimensions of 
interpassivity can already be distinguished in, or “traced back to,” earlier 
events. Interpassivity did not appear out of the blue. Although it certainly 
has its own peculiar, not to say idiosyncratic characteristics, it is in a way 
an extension and a radicalization of certain earlier developments. The 
reason to reserve the term “interpassivity” for the specific cultural 
constellation appearing in the 1990s is, for me, that it refers to a state 
after or beyond interactivity; or at least, it is a condition that arose in 
reaction to the dominance of interactivity, in art, politics, and society 
more generally. Given the fact that not earlier in history has there been, or 
could there have been, any such paradigm of interactive relations, 
between citizens and institutions, it makes no sense to speak of 
interpassivity when referring to cultural constellations obtaining earlier 
than, say, thirty years ago. Therefore, I don’t think it makes much sense to 
say that Lacan’s remark on the function of the Greek tragic choir ‘passed 
unnoticed for a long time’ as an observation of (early) interpassivity.17 The 
choir mourned “on behalf of the spectators,” yes, but these early Greek 




spectators did not enjoy an interactive relation with their institutions, so 
there is no ground to see this kind of “outsourcing” of passivity or 
enjoyment as a reaction against the demands made by interactivity. 
 
 In other words, a lot of things must have happened in the mean 
time in order for us to be able to start suffering from interpassivity. Most 
importantly, the ideal and practice of emancipation must have taken 
shape; emancipation, to put it in a Hegelian way, must have largely 
realized itself. But simultaneously, to continue in a Hegelian way, things 
must have gone awry somehow, in the mean time. Interpassivity is not 
the simple “realization” of some earlier idea, or the straightforward 
outcome of its development. It is rather the unforeseen and unintended 
outcome of an idea like emancipation. And this, as Pfaller rightly argues, 
is not a matter of a “thwarting” by empirical circumstances of some 
previously unpolluted ideal. Rather, the problem lies in the ideal itself; a 
kind of “dialectics of Enlightenment” is at work here. As Pfaller, following 
Zizek, puts it: “if an emancipatory theory turns, during its actualization, 
into a most repressive nightmare, then this is not to be understood as a 
simple abuse of the noble theory – ‘we should rather indicate how it lies 
dormant in it as a possibility’.”18 
 
So there is already something in Enlightenment that will eventually 
enable the rise of interpassivity. Or more generally, something in the 
constellation of Enlightenment, modernity and protestantism. This 
something we may very generally indicate as subjectivity. Man realises 
his own ability to think for himself, and to take responsibility for how to 
give shape to the human world, to society. Modern man creates the 
world out of a particular kind of self-relation called subjectivity, as Hegel 
says; there is nothing but his own subjectivity to base this creation on.19 
The principle of subjectivity is thus, if not the most important 
philosophical principle of modernity, then certainly the principle most 
characteristic of it. Every human relation or constellation has to somehow 
be understood and justified through subjective assessment and 
investigation; there is nothing we can put “outside” of us – “outsource” to 
some external, alien authority. We become emancipated when we 




acquire the status and the capabilities to appeal to the principle of 
subjectivity in order to justify our actions and beliefs. 
 
 We see this principle reflected in many of the practices and 
institutions of modern life, such as democracy, rights, entitlements, and 
more generally the norms that – with our consent – regulate social and 
political life. Everyone is personally involved, at least in the sense that 
everyone has the right to see him – or herself as a person recognized 
and respected in both formal and informal arrangements. Not only does 
everyone have the capacity and the status to join in the debates and the 
decisions on how to arrange our collective lives; such capacities are also 
institutionally facilitated and supported, and this status is also legally 
protected. We would find it very hard, if not impossible, to live without 
these arrangements, capacities and statuses. In that sense it would be 
hard to imagine for us to forego the rights, privileges and statuses 
connected to subjectivity, and to being recognized as a person. This 
becomes sufficiently clear the moment such rights, privileges or statuses 
are being violated, denied, or taken away, by authoritarian government, 
or by intolerant society. 
 
 Yet there is also another side to this “taking personal” of modern 
life by modern individuals. We moderns might be said to “take things too 
personal.” We come to expect, and even demand, that all arrangements, 
institutions and practices of modern society take notice of us, that they 
perceive and acknowledge us in our personal convictions and our 
individual specificity. This might be said to instil in us a certain proclivity 
for narcissism, when we conceive of narcissism as the expectation that 
the external world literally and figuratively reflects us, allows us to project 
ourselves in its structures and institutions. In other words, when we 
expect society to reflect our subjectivity back to us so that we may 
admire ourselves in this image. Or perhaps more tellingly, that we can 
become indignant when we feel that our peculiar personal 
distinctiveness is insufficiently recognizable in this image. 
 
 Modern western society thus may be said to have always 
harboured a potential for narcissism – perhaps already visible in Jean-




Jacques Rousseau’s view of world and self. The point here is that when 
people are burdened, or burden themselves, with the ability and the 
responsibility of creating and maintaining their selves and their world by 
their own efforts and their own designs, they will be likely to be in 
constant need of affirmation of their efforts, their designs, and maybe 
above all, of the fact or illusion that they are really distinctive individuals 
who should be appreciated, and confirmed, in the value of their unique 
subjective existence. And because that affirmation can no longer be 
received from traditional sources such as God or nature, or any other 
self-evident and undisputed source of authority, it can only be procured 
from man-made social arrangements and be based on assessments by 
other human beings. It is thus to be expected that individuals will 
demand such continuous re-affirmation from other individuals, or 
collectives. 
 
 This potential for narcissism was of course not immediately and 
fully released, or realised, with the advent of modernity. It took time for 
the philosophical principles of modernity to become realised in actual 
life, to become a regular part of both the institutional and the personal 
dimension of life in modern society. For those who would see a 
teleological style of argument shimmering through here: the time taken 
here is not like for some fruit to ripen, but the time needed to fight things 
out between the different sides in opposing social force-fields, as well as 
the time taken by technological developments. Emancipation, being the 
main individual and collective process at state here, is a process driven 
by the principles of modernity itself and realised by and through social 




The 1960s and 1970s constitute a major historical turning point for the 
principle of emancipation – and thus indirectly of subjectivity – to 
become broadly and extensively realised. There is no need to belabour 
the enormous impact of, most notably, the civil rights movement and of 
feminism on social and political relations in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Not to speak of sex, drugs, and rock&roll. The times they are a-




changin! Selma, Vietnam, Woodstock, Gloria Steinem, and reliable 
contraception indeed change the world. Previously excluded or 
marginalized groups and minorities speak up and demand to be heard 
and seen. Traditional institutions and ways of life find themselves under 
attack. Many institutions, such as in education and in health care, have to 
reinvent and reorganize themselves, in response to the demands by a 
newly empowered clientele aware of its often newly won rights and not 
afraid to assert itself in the face of previously impenetrable and 
impervious institutions and authorities. Personal relations change quite 
dramatically as well. The relations between the sexes become much 
more equal and many stigmata with regard to private life, especially 
sexuality, are being set aside. And finally, in close connection with these 
transformations, there is also a “culture war” being waged, in which new 
lifestyles and cultural life forms clash against established, traditional 
ones.  
 
 Generally, all traditional forms of authority are now considered 
suspect and obsolete. Politically, this translates into attacks on 
established political entities such as old-school parties, authoritarian 
government, and unresponsive institutions. There is a widespread and 
urgent call for democratization, at all levels and across all institutions. 
People demand to have a say in the way in which the institutions 
determining their lives are run. They are no longer going to put up with 
traditionalism. Instead of simply issuing rules and maintaining order 
through a mixture of repression and paternalism, authorities must now 
start to justify themselves – increasingly under pressure from the media, 
whose influence is rapidly increasing. But also more widely in people’s 
lives, there is a shift taking place from “command household” to 
“negotiation household,” as Dutch sociologist Abram de Swaan has aptly 
put it.20 Authority is no longer associated with fixed hierarchical statuses; it 
now comes to depend on processes of negotiation and discussion, in 
which all parties involved have a say, and none can claim to speak for all. 
 
 Widespread, radical and irreversible as these changes may be, 
they are not universally perceived as liberating and emancipating. 
Conservatives criticize them as an all too rash upset of established social 




and cultural patterns – the predictable counter-move to the well known 
1968 exhortation “be reasonable, demand the impossible!”. But there are 
also other cultural critics who see something repressive and problematic 
in this ostensible gain in freedom and release of emancipatory powers. 
And, in line with the exposition on the Enlightenment above, something 
narcissistic. Emancipation tells people that they have the right to be 
noticed, to be seen by society – an aspect implicitly shared by most or 
even all concepts of emancipation, and explicitly brought out in Jacques 
Rancière’s notion of emancipation as a change in the “partage du 
sensible”.21 Emancipation is thus on the one hand something personal. 
The objective principle that everyone is important and everyone matters 
has the subjective implication that you matter and that I matter; we both, 
as individuals, regardless of our social or cultural status, or lack of it, have 
a claim to be noticed, acknowledged, and recognized. On the other 
hand, it is also something public. We have a right to be visible to others –
to not lead a merely personal life, but to appear and be visible in the 
midst of those that constitute the social, cultural, and political society that 
I am part of. 
 
 As Richard Sennett has understood early on, such public visibility 
cannot be something naive, spontaneous, or natural – something 
Rousseauian. On the contrary, public visibility as a modern citizen is 
more like an art, requiring the development and mastery of a set of skills 
and a repertoire of actions, movements, and statements, to be deployed 
depending on the situation one finds oneself in.22 This is so because in 
the public sphere in modern society, we are in the company of strangers. 
We do not personally know those we interact with, and therefore we 
necessarily depend on a set of impersonal rules – norms and 
conventions – to regulate our interaction. We may become aware of 
them when we ask ourselves what it takes to successfully negotiate busy 
train stations, crowded streets, neighbourhood cafes, soccer matches, 
political demonstrations, and what not. While normally in the 
background, we especially become aware of such conventions when 
someone breaks them, by bumping into us, talking too loud, standing too 
close to us, or being too friendly. There is a fine line between being too 
rude and being too courteous, between being entertaining and being 




annoying. Being in public space requires the ability and the awareness to 
discern these behavioural patterns and to accommodate to them. And, 
as emancipation also requires, to accept and recognize others, as those 
with an equal status to be publicly present. 
 
 The point here is that the public dimension of emancipation is 
something primarily impersonal. We have a title to be publicly seen, not 
for “what we are,” but for what we do, and for how we present ourselves 
(this is the Arendtian dimension in Sennett). As Sennett saw, this 
impersonal character of emancipation as a public practice runs counter 
to the personal aspect of emancipation understood as the ability and the 
right to self-realisation. And more particularly, to the experience of self-
realisation in terms of personal identity and difference, which became 
increasingly popular in the late 1960s and early 1970. There was a strong 
feeling that traditional society had been repressive, and that the 
successful fight against such repression would mean that now there was 
space to develop a “real me,” a personal identity untainted by 
discrimination, segregation, and subordination. Accordingly, there was a 
rising expectation that the public sphere was the place where this 
unrepressed, personal identity could and should be recognized. The 
“mask” of public identity increasingly became experienced as something 
negative, something to be cast off in order to reveal some truer identity 
behind it. 
 
 Maybe Sennett pressed the formal dimension of interaction in 
public space too far. There will always be some aspect of teasing – some 
routine of seduction – around hiding and revealing, presenting and 
withdrawing, being open and reserved, when addressing others in public 
space. And since the cultural revolution of the 1960s, public life is bound 
to be more “playful,” more joyful, and more informal than before, without 
overly threatening the ability of us as modern individuals, in interaction 
with civil servants, to maintain a public sphere. However Sennett was 
right about the problematic aspects of the increasing desire to penetrate 
“behind the mask” in the public sphere, especially when this is done from 
the expectation that this will show up something that is real – real 
because intimate. 





This desire is what Sennett called the tyranny of intimacy.23 People 
increasingly find it imperative to present their personal, intimate affairs in 
public space. This is done by literally opening up to view what is intimate, 
but importantly also by discussing it – not only without shame or 
reticence, but even with a certain obsessiveness, incited in no small part 
by the idea that such discourse on the intimate contributes substantively 
to emancipation and self-realisation. This is the time when intimate 
matters start to be discussed on talk radio, and later on television. And 
also the time that interviewers start asking their subjects questions like: 
“How do you feel about what happened?”, and: “What went through you 
at that moment?”24 
 
 In this way, we are admonished and encouraged not only to care 
about our self and its realisation, but also to expect the public sphere and 
the public institutions to be responsive to our self-realisation. This creates 
institutions responsive to emancipation on the one hand, but a tendency 
towards narcissism on the other. In fact, according to Christopher Lasch 
in his bestseller The culture of narcissism from 1979, the 1960s ideal of 
emancipation has been betrayed by its 1970s inward turn, transforming a 
noble idea of independence in the American tradition of sturdy self-
reliance into its opposite: an insecure craving for continuous affirmation 
of one’s precious individual identity, supported by a newly established 
army of professional insecurity mongers called psychotherapists, who 
promise to make their clientele more free, but in fact only increase its 
dependency on institutional assistance. That is, the now ostensibly 
liberated and emancipated self-experience is accompanied by an 
obsessive need to self-reveal, in gesture and speech, and to have this 
recognized and supported by psychotherapeutic and other institutions. 
 
 While Sennett analysed this process in terms of the decline of the 
public sphere and the rising tyranny of intimacy, Michel Foucault around 
the same time did something comparable in terms of a history of 
sexuality and the “will to knowledge.” Foucault argued that the openness 
and frequency by which sexuality was publicly discussed did not so 
much emancipate, as install a new regime of discipline and self-control.25 




While previously the enjoyment of sex was supposedly being repressed, 
it was delusional to think that incessantly questioning oneself and others 
about sexual identity and experience would create emancipated beings, 
able to more or less unproblematically enjoy sex. Instead, we were now 
even more constrained than before, this time not be external restriction 
and enjoinments, but by our own self-imposed duty to discursively 
discover within ourselves, and then publicly disclose, the truth about our 
sexuality.26 In more Pfallerian terms, we merely exchanged one disturbed 
relation to enjoyment for another.  
 
 Thinking about Pfaller, there are two more possible points of 
convergence to consider here. First, we may note here the concurrence 
of a movement of protest with a more or less implicit conformity with a 
new regime of power or control, or as Foucault called it by then, a 
dispositif.27 The emancipatory movements of the 1960s and 1970s were of 
course often protest movements, in which people actively revolted 
against established forms of power. But simultaneously, and 
paradoxically, this active assertion of a newly acquired status or 
capability implies the insertion into a new kind of regime, which turns this 
activity into a kind of new complicity, or responsibility. When as 
emancipated beings we become independent and able to take matters 
into our own hands, we directly also become responsible for actually 
doing so, and for “monitoring” whether we make sufficient progress. We 
thus inadvertently deliver ourselves into the hands of a new kind of 
power, which makes us both more free and, in a different way, more 
unfree. 
 
 Second, the protest we are speaking about is at least partly 
directed against the culture of capitalism. The (post-)1968 proponents of 
counterculture may not all have been embittered enemies of capitalism, 
but for many of them, including famously Deleuze and Guattari, the 
problem of capitalism was precisely that it disturbed their experience of 
enjoyment. In conjunction with traditional psychoanalysis, capitalism 
organizes and controls how we can experience desire. In this era of 
“flower power” and emancipation, the problem is still that of the 
opposition of enjoyment and stratifying systems like capitalism. In the 




1990s, to which we will turn in a moment, the problem has become more 
the opposite: enjoyment has now all too successfully become aligned 





With the 1990s, we reach the era of interpassivity proper. And of 
neoliberalism proper. The dominance of capitalist ideology has perhaps 
never been stronger. With neoliberalism, government has been explicitly 
enlisted in the services of capitalist economy. Where in the 1970s 
government was supposed to provide the conditions for the free self-
realisation of individuals, now it is charged with the task of guaranteeing 
the self-realisation of the free market. We are now ruled by reference to 
GBP, or the Down Jones index. Credit rating agencies up- or downgrade 
not only banks and businesses, but even whole countries. Banks can 
gamble all they want, when considered “too big to fail.” Public 
administration reorganizes itself on the model of business management 
theory, most notably represented by Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing 
government from 1992. Privatization is rampant, following the new creed 
that almost everything government can do, the market can do better.  
 
 And more importantly, this ideology of market-driven operations 
has similarly penetrated the perception of private life. Also, in this sense, 
“privatization” has become rampant. People actually start to describe 
themselves as “flexible” and as being “open to new challenges,” 
translating corporate strategies into private virtues, neoliberal style.28 We 
must not only work at work, we must also work at our selves. Self-
realisation here is taking a new turn: we can only accomplish it by 
ceaseless work in both these dimensions. Actually, both tend to flow 
together, as consumption, or enjoyment, tends to become a form of 
labour, and in turn, labour tends to become a form of enjoyment. We 
have indeed become Genussarbeiter; even wellness is a kind of “working 
on your body.” As the phrase “work hard, play hard” indicates, we must 
enjoy ourselves, to the limit; similarly, we tend to look for self-realisation 
in work, for instance by “flexibly” bringing it home, and working nights 




and weekends. All this to maximize our efforts, and results, at work and 
self: “alles nur optimiert, bitte!” 
 
 Understandably, this dispositif puts a lot of stress on people; or 
worse, under such a regime, they put a lot of stress on themselves. They 
are expected, both by society and by themselves, to “get the most out of 
themselves,” literally as if they were a factor of production. Moreover, 
when they feel they have fallen short of this terribly ambitious goal, they 
typically blame themselves, rather than the conditions under which they 
labour and live. This results in considerable increases in burn-out and 
depression. Nowadays, it is not uncommon to become exhausted and 
depressed by the exertion necessary to become the best version of 
oneself.29 In Germany for instance, we see a considerable increase in 
cases of mental illness since 1994: the number of cases of incapacity for 
work due to mental illness has doubled over 1994-2010.30 
 
 Under such conditions, enjoyment becomes more problematic 
than ever before. There is little time left for enjoyment, and what time 
there is, falls victim to the ruling neoliberal ideology of optimisation and a 
seamless alignment of enjoyment and work. Neoliberalism, to put it in a 
Marxist way, robs people of their means of enjoyment. They are being 
replaced, in the mid-1990s, by an ascetic regime of self-realisation, in 
which enjoyable activities like drinking alcohol, smoking, and eating red 
meat are suddenly perceived as offensive, dangerous, and politically 
incorrect.31 For Pfaller, this implies a new kind of narcissism, in which 
people prefer being good over being happy, being healthy over being 
sociable, and being self-optimised over being cheerful. And it also 
implies a threat to public space, because this environment requires one 
to be “a bit more elegant, a bit more sensitive, and a bit more cheerful.” 32 
This capacity for a certain aesthetic “presentation of the self in public life” 
is threatened by neoliberal puritanism. 
 
 And worse, as already briefly mentioned, we now find neoliberal 
puritanism in a coalition with leftists stuck in their post-68 emancipation 
discourse. Both feel that someone is free when not determined by others, 
in this case for instance by not being bothered by someone else’s 




cigarette smoke. Pfaller feels that in the 1970s and 1980s, people were 
prepared to deals with such issues themselves, and even better, they 
were prepared to do so in an elegant way. For instance by graciously 
addressing the smoking other along the lines of: “well, I don’t smoke 
myself, but please go ahead, the smell is so enjoyable.” Now, however, 
laws are drawn up and enforced against smoking in public places, which 
by the left is even perceived as progress.  
 
 On this issue, I have to say that I place less trust than Pfaller in the 
self-regulating abilities of the public sphere, especially when it comes to 
smoking—a practice difficult to disentangle not only from serious health 
issues and problems of addiction, but also from an industry with very 
deep pockets and very large interests at stake. Some thirty years ago in 
the Netherlands, when plans were drawn up to legally restrict public 
smoking, the slogan “Smoking? We can work it out together” seemed to 
be everywhere and shared by everyone, circulating widely on television 
and in other media. An elegant message, one might say. The source of 
the message was left opaque, however much later it turned out to have 
been stealthily produced and plugged entirely by the tobacco industry.  
 
But it is certainly true that the late 1980s, early 1990s evinced a 
widespread, emancipatory enthusiasm for interactive decision-making 
which took hold across institutions, especially those of government. We 
can see this as the institutionalized legacy of the emancipatory 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which not only propagated 
individual emancipation, but also saw this as going together with the 
capacity and commitment to engage in collective deliberation over the 
shared goals and interests of society. Which, of course, is different from 
“working things out” privately, or through the market. Increasingly, 
decisions by institutions--and especially governmental ones--are seen as 
legitimate and acceptable only when everyone possibly affected by them 
has had the opportunity to engage in the process of deliberation and 
decisionmaking.33 Here we see the confluence of democratization and 
self-realization: being included in the democratic process is not only a 
confirmation of political equality, but also something to be valued in 
terms of self-realization. In other words, being excluded from the 




democratic process is increasingly being seen as harmful not only to the 
political community, but also as harmful to the self, and the self-
realization, of those excluded.  
 
This is the junction where Pfaller, in concert with Žižek, introduced 
the notion of interpassivity. They diagnosed it as a reaction to the 
dominance of interactivity in the scene of art, which required active 
participation by the visitor if the work of art was to realise itself. 
Interpassivity indicates a refusal of this invitation to be involved—or 
perhaps better: a pass— in the sense that interpassive works of art are 
no longer in need of the visitor’s contribution, or strictly speaking, of the 
visitor at all. An interpassive work of art can take care of its own 
reception. Pfaller says that we as visitors here “outsource” our enjoyment 
of it to the artwork itself. Perhaps it is equally adequate to say that the 
artwork “insources” this enjoyment by us, as frankly we remain unaware 
which of the parties initiates the shift. 
 
Despite my unmitigated enthusiasm for the concept of 
interpassivity, this is the place where I should register one more small 
dissent concerning the best way to diagnose it. I believe it is more 
adequate to say that what we outsource to the work of art is not our 
passivity or enjoyment, but our interactive involvement. Interpassivity is, 
after all, a reaction to (the dominance of) interactivity. The artwork thus 
indeed takes care of our involvement, but not merely of the passive side 
of it—the “enjoyment”—but of the interactive dimension it has now 
acquired as well. This is also because I believe that the interactive 
relation to works of art, but more generally to institutions, has become 
too important to us to simply dissolve or disappear. It still exists, and is 
even in full swing, but now in the form of virtual representation, as we 
might say: it is taken care of for us, on our behalf. In the case of artworks, 
this happens for instance through curators, catalogues, and reviewers, 
whose interactive involvement in a way pre-empts any interactive 
contribution by us regular visitors.  
 
In any case, we see Pfaller rightly pointing towards 
Dienstleistungskunst as the prime example of interpassive art.34 The 




enjoyment of art--as I would say, including its interactive dimension--is 
now offered as a service, by the artist, or the artwork. And indeed, this is 
what we see happening nowadays on quite a large scale. Increasingly, 
institutions can do without our participation, because they are now able 
to pre-empt whatever it is we could plausibly contribute. They can pro-
actively take care of my contribution--sometimes even better than I 
myself would be. Think of Amazon that, given its algorithmically powered 
analysis of my earlier searching and buying behaviour, already knows 
which book I am about to order—and even already may have sent it my 
way! Or think of Cambridge Analytics, the company which compiled 
relevant profiles of all American voters already before the 2016 
presidential elections took place, mostly using the vast database of 
Facebook likes as source material, so that voters could be—selectively—
“encouraged” to go vote.35 Or think of the many online vote-o-matics, 
which similarly compile your political profile for you, only now with your 
permission. 
 
So, we let the artwork deliver, or take care of, the contribution we 
would normally make. This avoidance of contributing, or participating, 
has a double, and even paradoxical meaning. On the one hand, we are 
abstaining from the (interactive) procedure that is going on, letting the 
artwork take care of it, on our behalf. The artwork virtually represents us. 
On the other hand, our interpassive stance also implies a refusal to 
engage with the interactive system. But importantly, it is not a 
straightforward protest against participation—that would again be one 
more move in the ‘game’ of interactivity! And therefore not fundamentally 
change that game. The interpassive stance, however, is therefore best 
characterized as a “refusal to refuse”—something like Melville’s Bartleby, 
who did not protest any assignment or request to act, but merely replied: 
“I would prefer not to.”  Without giving reasons, for that would bring him 
back into the game of interactive responsibility.  
 
Bartleby is perhaps not the best example, because it concerns just 
one individual, who moreover is no part of an interactively functioning 
institution. José Saramago’s Seeing is a more fitting literary example.36 
Here, the residents of the capital of an unnamed country suddenly, and 




in overwhelming majority, return blank votes: they come to the polls, 
hand in their voting cards, but without any of the boxes checked. They do 
not refuse to participate in the elections, but they rather refuse to refuse. 
The furious reaction of the (democratic) authorities in the story is in a 
way understandable, and even correct: modern individuals can 
legitimately be expected to behave as responsible citizens, actively 
supporting the system by being interactively engaged. But rather than 
properly protesting, the citizens more surreptitiously evade having to give 





I agree with Pfaller that the system functions so as to responsibilize us, 
and that interpassivity constitutes both a going along with it, and a 
surreptitious kind of protest against it. I also agree that such 
responsibilization is a design imposed by neoliberalism. But I also believe 
that it is a design implicit in the process of emancipation, and more 
importantly, that in many respects emancipation runs counter to 
neoliberalism. We are overburdened by both, but the cure cannot consist 
of merely doing away with neoliberalism. As long as we have the desire 
to shape our own lives, and collectively decide on the shape of collective 
life, we will be faced with this problem of overburdening, and with the 
ensuing interpassivity.  
 
 Actually, Pfaller agrees on this point, although we differ on the 
normative consequences. I believe the project of emancipation has 
produced interactive institutions and self-understandings that we cannot 
do away with without giving up our status as adult, responsible citizens 
who share responsibility for the way our shared world is shaped and 
controlled. Pfaller however considers this sticking to philosophical 
idealism instead of committing to (aesthetic) materialism. And as 
remaining stuck in narcissism, which entails seeing ourselves as active 
shapers of the world; we are narcissists as long as we believe that we 
spectators can turn into we producers.37  
 




 This concurs with what Richard Sennett proposed in The fall of 
public man: narcissism starts with the entrance of modernity and its 
project to continuously shape and change world and self. The 
conventional forms of civic interaction, or what Sennett calls “civility”—
the bonds that are forged on the premise of a certain social distance 
from others—lose their meaning.38 We have come to expect that the 
public world extends us warmth, trust, and open expression of feeling. 
And it will inevitably disappoint us by failing to do so, making us withdraw 
into ourselves and become silent “spectators” of a now barren public 
scene. The downfall of civility is accompanied by the rise of narcissism, 
characterized by Sennett as “the protestant ethic of modern times.”39  
 
As mentioned, Pfaller’s critique of narcissism also aligns with what 
Sennett in the late 1990s argued in The corrosion of character: we even 
desperately desire to shape and reshape ourselves, so as to be more 
ready to meet the demands of neoliberalism. And the analogy can even 
be extended to Sennett’s late work, in which he turns to craftsmanship 
and to cooperation as forms through which we might endure the 
pressures of modern life. This fits well with Pfaller’s view that narcissists 
detest ‘everything solid, work product-oriented, immutable’.40 And finally, 
both also feel that such resistance means engaging in ritualistic 
practices performed in the public sphere. For Sennett this is mostly 
related to issues of craftsmanship and cooperation, while Pfaller of 
course is more interested in the dimension of enjoyment; however, the 
convergence on how to resist colonization of the public sphere by 
narcissistic individuals and neoliberal policies is unmistakable.41 
 
 The expression ‘aesthetics of delegated enjoyment’ refers mostly 
to public practices that somehow manage to evade, or even slightly 
sabotage, the project of responsibilization, and that are similarly immune 
to the lure of narcissism. This is partly due to their ritualistic dimension, as 
rituals lack the pretence, or illusion, that anything will change as a 
consequence of performing the ritual. Ritual is part and parcel of what 
Pfaller calls a “culture of Augenschein”:42 acting as if we are fooling some 
naive third party who looks on and who would take all our courtesies and 
gallantries “at face value.” This naive observer saves us from having to 




internalize the illusions we live by and having to claim responsibility for 
them. And through this imagined naive third party, we of course hold 
ourselves in check; we manage to maintain civil relations in an 
anonymous public space for which no clear and settled rules can exist 
anymore.  
 
 Public life is thus for Pfaller a form of magic: a public fulfils the role 
of naive third party that believes in the reality of the performance that we 
put up. In other words, in “primitive societies” it is not so much the 
“medicine man” who performs the magic, but the tribe members that 
look on. In modern society, however, it is not so easy to create the 
conditions needed to conjure up magic; or in other words, to constitute 
publics who are willing and able to perform as naive third parties. First, 
we don’t believe we perform magic; we relegate this to cultures that we 
call “primitive.” For Pfaller however, we moderns are in this regard more 
primitive than the primitives because we are less aware than they are 
about the magic that we are both performing.43 Second, because 
Foucaultian disciplining has worked—or as I would prefer to formulate it, 
because the project of emancipation has been successful. What used to 
be experienced as courteous and charming intercourse, is now rejected, 
because we find such social and cultural imperatives “normative.” In 
other words, we are disinclined to accept them at face value, hence we 
live in a “culture of complaint” rather than one of Augenschein. And 
thirdly, neoliberalism encroaches upon public space, privatizing space 
and financializing things that used to be public.44  
 
 As Pfaller has indeed himself proposed, interpassivity is thus 
always also a theory of public space.45 The forms that characterize 
interpassive behaviour are necessarily performed in public, and more 
importantly, they resist what Habermas would call the colonization of 
public space by responsibilization, validation, and financialization. 
Although of course Pfaller believes that the Habermasian recipe of 
deliberation on and validation of social norms has not supported, but 
rather help undermine public space. A public can only arise if and when 
form is produced but not interiorized – or responsibilized, or validated, or 
financialized. Public is thus not constituted through speech, and 




intersubjectivity, as Habermas would have it. It is also not something 
Arendtian, in the sense that it is not about something new that could be 
produced in and by coming together. It is more something Sennettian: 
visual, bodily, non-verbal as well as verbal, and above all theatrical.46 To 
this short list, we can add Judith Butler, who in her recent work Notes 
towards a performative theory of assembly presents the freedom and 
ability to “assemble” in public space, to manifest oneself bodily in public 
space amidst others and thus “occupy space,” as even more important 
than the “freedom of speech” so crucial to liberal political theory.47  
 
 Among Richard Sennett’s favourite examples of behaviour that 
constitutes and supports public space are walking through the city and 
conversing with whatever people you meet in a bar. Both are very 
everyday, uncomplicated practices, which express an ability to be with 
and to feel at home among strangers, precisely by not becoming 
acquainted with them, by not asking ‘what goes through them’, by not 
trying to pry behind the mask, by not attempting to achieve some 
consensus, and by not aiming to become intimate. In other words, by 
letting the magic of publicness, Öffentlichkeit, arise not through any 
special effort to do so, but by socially remaining on the surface, not 
destroying the fragile structure of publicness by interiorizing, validating, 
or responsibilizing it. 
 
 This is also why publicness-constituting behaviour for Pfaller 
always has something irresponsible—something non-biopolitical, we 
would say in a Foucaultian context. His favourite example is of course 
smoking. Tobacco culture is not something innocent. As Pfaller reminds 
us, it was an important part of European bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit which 
was bitterly and bloodily fought for in 1848: smoking tobacco and 
exchanging thoughts in coffee houses.48 Prohibiting public smoking for 
reasons of public health—biopolitics—is thus for Pfaller equivalent to a 
neoliberal attack on public culture, under the guise of protecting the 
weak. And perhaps even more importantly, it curtails or undermines the 
ability to elegantly and gracefully perform public ritual essential to 
cultivate public space. 
 




 There is a lot one could say about this provocative notion that 
smoking may be bad for private health, but—partly for that reason—good 
for the health of Öffentlichkeit. For instance, that blowing smoke in 
someone else’s face is the opposite of elegant, as some of Pfaller’s 
interviewers not unreasonably object. We may also doubt whether 
antibiopolitical acts like smoking might somehow seriously wrong-foot 
neoliberalism and its intrusion on public space and create something like 
a “positive Öffentlichkeit.”49 And we even might not fully share Pfaller’s 
conception of elegance, as I noticed that he also declares it applicable 
to, of all things, Louis Althusser’s writings.50  
 
 For these and other reasons, I think it would be best, as mentioned, 
to consider Robert Pfaller’s imaginative and stimulating writings less as a 
full-blown theory of public space—although interpassivity is a notion that 
could and should enrich any such fuller theory of public space—and 
more as a perfectly relevant theory of public grace. From this perspective, 
I propose we see Pfaller’s prime example of smoking as justly evoking 
the fragile, ephemeral and indeed aesthetic character of what we 
perform when we constitute public space. Yes, it is also a subtle protest 
against neoliberal biopolitics. But it is primarily the performance of a ritual 
that is both sociable and aesthetic, whose most important fragile 
aesthetics literally arises as a side effect or ‘afterthought’: the smoke that 
drifts through space ‘passively’ after each of the smoker’s puffs, the thin 
swirls of smoke curling up elegantly to the ceiling, before dissolving into 
space, to make room for new creations that ‘occupy space’, for one more 
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